Making Babies by the Flip of a Coin?
Matthew A. CARLTON and William D. STANSFIELD

Many probability and genetics textbooks pose standard questions about eye color, birth defects, sexes of children, and so on.
Solutions to these questions, specifically about sexes, generally
make two assumptions: first, that a randomly selected embryo
is equally likely to be male or female; second, that the sexes
of successive children from the same parents are independent.
In other words, probabilists (and some geneticists) treat sexes
of children like flips of a fair coin: two possible outcomes, each
equally likely, with outcomes independent from trial to trial. But
are these assumptions realistic? Demographic data suggest that
neither a balance of sexes nor true independence exist in nature.
Yet most textbooks, both in genetics and probability theory, continue to use the binomial distribution as an acceptable approximation for solving genetics problems involving live-birth sex
ratios in species where sex is determined by an XX versus XY
chromosome mechanism. We look at a widely circulated article
in Parade magazine regarding the gender distribution in human
families with two children and analyze comparable data from
federal sources to show that such families do not conform to
any binomial distribution. The sequence of investigations we
take here could be followed in an introductory or intermediate
probability and statistics course.
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1. THE ORIGINAL PROBLEM AND THE
MATHEMATICIAN’S SOLUTION
Popular magazine columnist Marilyn vos Savant (1997) received the following problem from one of her readers. “A woman
and a man (unrelated) each have two children. At least one of
the woman’s children is a boy, and the man’s older child is a boy.
Do the chances that the woman has two boys equal the chances
that the man has two boys?” Vos Savant replied that the chances
the woman has two boys are about 1 in 3, while the chances the
man has two boys are about 1 in 2. To substantiate her answer,
which many readers found counter-intuitive, she conducted a
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volunteer survey (by E-mail and letters) from respondents with
exactly two children, at least one of which is a boy, with the
following results. In a total of 17,946 responses, 35.9% (about
1 in 3) reported two boys.
In what follows, we will let B and G denote the events a child
is a boy or girl, respectively. Also, we will let BG denote the
event a two-child family has an older boy and a younger girl
(similarly for GB, BB, and GG).
The question posed to vos Savant is a famous one in conditional probability. The solution hinges on the assumption a parent with exactly two children is equally likely to have any of the
four possible gender sequences BB, BG, GB, or GG. Suppose
this were indeed the case. Given that at least one of the woman’s
children is a boy, three of the original gender sequences are possible (all but GG); because we are assuming these are equally
likely, the conditional probability of BB is now 1 in 3. In contrast, knowledge that the man’s first child is a boy leaves only
BB and BG as potential gender sequences for his children, and
thus the conditional probability of BB equals 1/2.
Hence, from the mathematical perspective (which might or
might not have been the poser’s intent), vos Savant’s solution is
correct. But what underlies the assumption that all four gender
sequences are equally likely? In the language of probability, this
assumption asserts that (1) a live birth is equally likely to be a
boy or a girl, that is, Pr(B) = Pr(G) = 1/2, and (2) the gender
of a second child is independent of the gender of the first child.
Conditions (1) and (2) can be stated equivalently by saying the
number of boys (or girls) in a two-child family is a binomial
random variable with probability parameter 1/2.
Of these two conditions, (2) is more fundamental, and we will
address this later. Suppose we grant the independence assumption for now, but we generalize to an arbitrary boy-girl ratio. Let
Pr(B) = b and Pr(G) = g, with g = 1 − b. Then the probabilities of BB, BG, GB, GG are bb, bg, gb, and gg, respectively.
The probability the woman has two boys, given she has at least
one boy, now equals
bb
b2
b
Pr(BB)
=
= 2
=
.
Pr(BB, BG, GB)
bb + bg + gb
b + 2bg
b + 2g
Similarly, the probability the man has two boys, given that his
older child is a boy, equals b/(b + g). Notice that when the
boy-girl ratio is 1:1, that is, b = g = .5, these reduce to the
original 1/3 and 1/2, respectively. We can also rephrase these
probabilities in terms of the boy-girl ratio: if we define r = b/g,
the two aforementioned probabilities are r/(r+2) and r/(r+1),
respectively.

Table 1. All Biological Children 10 and Younger Years of Age
in Two-Child Families. Data from 1998–2002 NHIS, courtesy of
Debra Blackwell, NCHS.
Gender sequence
girl-girl (GG)
boy-girl, boy older (BG)
girl-boy, girl older (GB)
boy-boy (BB)
Total

Number of families
5,844
6,628
6,451
6,545
25,468

Percent of sample
22.95%
26.02%
25.33%
25.70%
100.00%

We mentioned before that vos Savant’s survey found 35.9% of
women with at least one boy (in families of exactly two children)
had two boys, which is close to 1 in 3. She commented, “Given
that there are about 106 boys born for every 100 girls, the actual
percentage in the population would be closer to 33.9%.” This
is, in fact, incorrect. Presumably, vos Savant simply multiplied
35.9% by the ratio 100/106, since this is indeed 33.9% to one
decimal place. The correct “adjustment,” still operating under
the assumption of gender independence, would be to substitute
r = 1.06 into the first fraction above, yielding 1.06/3.06 =
34.6%.
In any case, the voluntary survey at least validates vos Savant’s correct assertion that the “chances” posed in the original
question, though similar-sounding, are different, and that the
first probability is certainly nearer to 1 in 3 than to 1 in 2.
2. FEDERAL DATA ON TWO-CHILD FAMILIES
Since vos Savant’s survey was purely voluntary, it would obviously be incorrect to use her data for inferential purposes.
We turn instead to data from the National Health Interview
Survey (NHIS), conducted annually by the Center for Disease
Control’s National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) under
contract with the U.S. Census Bureau. The NHIS employs a
probability sampling plan; for details, consult their Web site
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs. The data in Table 1 show the gender
sequence for all biological children ages 10 and younger in twochild families from the NHIS five-year cohort 1998 to 2002. We
discuss the consequences of using this particular dataset in the
following.
We realize that this is not the best dataset for our purposes,
because these data do not account for monozygotic twins, still
births, abortions, and child fatalities up to age 10 (i.e., a two-child
family in our data may have had older or intervening children
who died). Ideally, we would have data from all parents who have
given birth to exactly two children, but such data are not readily
available. That said, we believe the aforementioned categories
are relatively small; for example, monozygotic twins comprise
less than .5% of all live births in the United States (Stern 1960,
pp. 533–534).
3. GENDER (IM)BALANCE AND (IN)DEPENDENCE
We wish to see whether the NHIS data substantiates the 1:1
boy-girl ratio and/or the assumption of independent sequential sexes. We shall rely on standard statistical techniques for
the analyses; see Samuels and Witmer (2003) or DeGroot and
Schervish (2002) for reference. In what follows, we present
three partly redundant tests for illustrative purposes; we caution against performing numerous, overlapping hypothesis tests

Table 2. Observed Counts, Expected Counts (in parentheses), and ChiSquare Contributions (in italics) for a Binomial Goodness-of-Fit Test,
using the NHIS Dataset
Number of boys
Observed
Expected
Chi-square

0
5,844
(6,021.32)
5.222

1
13,079
(12,724.35)
9.885

2
6,545
(6,722.32)
4.677

on the same dataset in practice. Instructors who elect to use this
data can follow our sequence or choose to show only the test(s)
appropriate to their students’ level.
First, we consider the boy-girl ratio among all families with
exactly two children. Most statisticians and biologists are aware
that boy babies and girl babies are not equally likely. Curiously,
the boy/girl birth ratio is greater than one; this contrasts with
the well-known fact that women outnumber men overall. (According to the 2000 Census, there were 96.3 males of all ages
for every 100 females in the United States.) Although it is impossible at present to determine the actual numbers of fertilized
human eggs bearing XX versus XY chromosomes, data from
the 2000 U.S. Census show that the number of males per 100
females under five years of age is about 104.8. Let us compare
that figure to our NHIS data.
Using all 50,936 children in the NHIS dataset, we have 26,169
boys (51.38%) and 24,767 girls (48.62%). This yields an estimated boy-girl ratio of r̂ = 1.0566, or about 106 boys for every
100 girls (the same number offered by vos Savant without citation). However, these 50,936 children comprise a random sample
only if we believe sexes of second children are independent of the
sexes of their older siblings. Since we do not believe this to be
true (in fact, we will refute this claim shortly), we will estimate
the boy-girl ratio using first-born children only.
Of the 25,468 first-born children in the NHIS dataset, 13,173
(51.72%) are boys. A standard large-sample z-test of the hypothesis Pr(B) = Pr(G) = 1/2 yields a test statistic of z = 5.50 (p
value ≈ 0). The NHIS data decisively refute the 1:1 human sex
ratio, at least among first live births in two-child families. But,
again, this is hardly news, since we already noted that U.S. Census data also shows a gender imbalance in American children.
Do two-child families follow any binomial model? To find out,
we test conformity of the number of boys in a two-child family to
a binomial distribution with n = 2 and an arbitrary probability
parameter, b. This model allows for gender imbalance but still
assumes that a single parameter characterizes the chance of a
male baby for both the first and second child. Under this null
hypothesis (which further hypothesizes sexes of siblings to be
independent), our maximum likelihood estimate of b is b̂ =
26,169/50,936 = .5138. Table 2 shows the elements of the
corresponding goodness-of-fit test.
The chi-square goodness-of-fit test statistic is a statistically
huge 19.784 at 1 degree of freedom (p value ≈ 0); though there
are three categories, we lose one additional degree of freedom to
the estimation of b. We conclude that the number of boys in twochild families does not follow any binomial distribution, even
one with a gender imbalance. Notice that the binomial model
predicts considerably more same-sex sibships than actually appear in the NHIS data, and that GG families (x = 0) contribute
more to the chi-square statistic than BB families (x = 2).

Table 3. Observed Cell Counts, Expected Cell Counts (in
parentheses), and Chi-Square Contributions (in italics) for a Chi-Square
Test of Independence of Successive Sexes, Using the NHIS Dataset.
Second child
G
B
G

5,844
(6,021)
5.204

6,451
(6,274)
4.994

B

6,628
(6,451)
4.857

6,545
(6,722)
4.662

First child

are “exceedingly rare.” And even if such a maternal-fetal incompatibility system exists, it would not explain the dearth of BB
families in the NHIS data.
Of course, one obvious nonbiological explanation is that parents may be more likely to stop having children if they have had
one child of each sex than if they have had two boys or two girls.
This would clearly result in fewer same-sex sibships in two-child
families. Unfortunately, data are not available on the reasons parents stopped having children. It must thus be acknowledged that,
at present, a very plausible biological mechanism to explain the
results of this study has yet to be found.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Finally, we test for independence of siblings’ sexes without
any other restrictions on the probabilities of boy and girl babies.
In particular, we no longer require that the chances of the first
child being a girl and the second child being a girl be equal. Table 3 displays the actual and expected cell counts for a standard
chi-square test of independence. The results are a chi-square
statistic of 19.717 at 1 degree of freedom (p value ≈ 0), with
GG families making the largest contribution to the chi-square
value. It is interesting to note that the NHIS data show 354 more
opposite-sex siblings (and, concordantly, 354 fewer same-sex
siblings) than expected. If anything, we would anticipate that
monozygotic twins would increase the number of same-sex siblings over what is expected under an independence assumption.
4. WHAT COULD EXPLAIN THE DISCREPANCIES?
If we accept that the sample data accurately reflect the population, we must seek a biological mechanism to explain these
results. Can a fetus sensitize its mother against the fetus’ sex,
making a same-sex sibling less likely? Recent research (e.g.,
Condon et al. 2004) shows that a mouse fetus can send specific
messages to its mother. However, the research does not indicate
that these messages affect the mother long enough to influence
future fertilizations. Fetuses can induce sustained immunological responses over more than one pregnancy. For example, it is
well known that an Rh+ baby born to an Rh− woman can stimulate her to produce a long-lasting antibody response that could
affect the survival of any subsequent Rh+ fetus. However, there
is no known biological correlation between sex and Rh status.
The Y chromosome could, in theory, be at least partly responsible for the appearance of fewer-than-expected BB families.
After all, the Y chromosome of a male embryo or fetus carries
genes whose products would be foreign to its mother’s immune
system, and so it seems plausible that a boy fetus could sensitize
his mother to make antibodies against protein products of Ylinked genes. But this would obviously not explain the scarcity
of GG families, and we find no such Y-linked immunological
incompatibilities reported in the literature.
On the other hand, it might be possible for an X-linked gene
product in a girl fetus to stimulate her mother to make antibodies that might affect her own survival as well as that of the next
girl sibling, but not of a boy sibling. Because a boy inherits his
X chromosome only from his mother, a male fetus would not
stimulate his mother to make antibodies against his X-linked
gene products. However, if the mother lacks an X-linked gene
that her female baby has received from the father, that girl fetus
could sensitize the mother and cause an immune attack on any
subsequent female embryos sired by the same man. The Xg locus (Sutton 1980) is the only example of this phenomenon we
could find. Although this model immunological system might
contribute to the dearth of GG sibships in families of size two,
Sutton reports that mothers who form such X-linked antibodies

So, it appears that sexes of human births in two-child families
do not follow a binomial model with Pr(B) = Pr(G) = 1/2,
or with any other probability parameter. Should we stop using
this example and these model assumptions to teach conditional
probability and independence? Not necessarily. We use genetics
examples in probability for their pedagogical merits, not because the binomial model exactly reflects biological reality. (As
George Box aptly put it, “All models are wrong; some models
are useful.”) For an introductory probability course, the mathematical solution in Section 1 still illustrates one of the more
intriguing applications of conditional probability. In fact, we
can use this opportunity to discuss with our students the notion of underlying model assumptions and the consequences of
violating these assumptions.
At the same time, students in a biostatistics course should find
the gender imbalance and lack of independence in human sexes
interesting. In particular, lack of independence among sexes of
children with the same parents will surely come as a surprise to
many biology students (not to mention geneticists and demographers). The simple z and chi-square hypothesis tests in Section
3, accessible to introductory biostatistics students, show these
two plausible assumptions are actually not supported by this
dataset.
Alternatively, one can present the data and the dilemma as
an open-ended problem (in a senior-level statistics course, for
example). The “dilemma” can be presented either as testing the
binomial model for sexes of siblings, or as validating/refuting
the probability solutions of 1/2 and 1/3 from Section 1. Students
must then select for themselves which statistical test(s) to use—
we have not exhausted them all here—and justify their choices.
More advanced statistics students are encouraged to explore alternative models for birth sexes; for example, if you know the
sex of an oldest child, what are the chances the next child will
be of the same/opposite sex? And do your answers depend on
the sex of the oldest child?
[Received August 2004. Revised December 2004.]
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